Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Florida by Gozansky, Nathaniel E.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-1963
Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Florida
Nathaniel E. Gozansky
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Florida, 17 U. Miami L. Rev. 587 (1963)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol17/iss4/7
LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
NATHANIEL E. GOZANSKY*
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The last clear chance doctrine originated with the landmark English
decision of Davies v. Mann.' Simply stated, the facts were as follows:
the plaintiff staked his fettered donkey in the highway, the animal being
unable to move out of the path of oncoming traffic. The defendant was
walking behind his horse-drawn wagon and could not see, but if he had
been in the driver's seat he could have seen the animal and avoided the
collision; as a result of this negligence the defendant's horses and wagon
collided with and killed the donkey. The trial judge directed the jury
that "if they thought that the accident might have been avoided by the
exercise of ordinary care on the part of the driver, to find for the
plaintiff."' The Court of the Exchequer in affirming this direction held
that since the defendant could have avoided injuring the donkey by
proper care and did not, he was liable for the consequences of his neg-
ligence, though the donkey may have been improperly in his path.
Firstly, the plaintiff, in placing the donkey in a position of peril,
was contributorily negligent; secondly, that peril was such that the
donkey could not extricate himself therefrom; thirdly, the defendant, if
proceeding with reasonable care, should have become aware of, and
appreciated, the donkey's peril; and finally, the defendant in the exercise
of ordinary care could have avoided the injury.8 This, then, is the
original doctrine of last clear chance, which is a limitation on the defense
of contributory negligence.4
This new doctrine was immediately accepted by the English courts.5
In a later House of Lords decision,6 Lord Penzance, after stating the
rule of contributory negligence, made the following observation:
But there is another proposition equally well established,
and it is a qualification on the first [contributory negligence]
* Assistant Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Assistant in Instruction
for Freshmen, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
2. 10 M. & W. 546, 547, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
3. It is important to note that the negligence of the plaintiff in the Davies case was
such that it continued up to the point of impact, for once the donkey was placed in the road
the negligence continued until such time as he might be removed therefrom.
4. "The general result ... before Davies v. Mann . . . is ... that if the plaintiff
is guilty of any negligence contributing to cause the injury complained of, he could not in
any circumstances recover." Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence,
3 HARV. L. REV. 263 (1890).
5. The doctrine of last clear chance "is fully established by the recent cases." Dimes
v. Petley, 15 Q.B. 276, 283 (1850). See also Tuff v. Warman, 5 C.B. (N.S.) 573 (1858).
6. Radley v. London & No. W. Ry. Co., 1 App. Cas. 754 (1876).
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namely, that though the plaintiff may have been guilty of neg-
ligence, and although the negligence may, in fact, have con-
tributed to the accident, yet if the defendant could in the result,
by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have avoided the
mischief which happened, the plaintiff's negligence will not
excuse him.
This proposition, as one of law, cannot be questioned. It
was decided in the case of Davies v. Mann . . -and has been
universally applied in cases of this character without question.7
The doctrine met with little criticism thereafter8 and had already
begun to work its way across the ocean to the United States, where it
was warmly, but thoughtlessly, received by our courts.' The develop-
ment of the doctrine in this country is perhaps best summed up by the
following comment:
But the most startling observation about the development
of this exception is the quickness with which it became lost in
the limbo of proximate cause. It had hardly secured a footing
before the courts and writers began to demand a sounder basis
for it than that afforded by the good sense apparent from the
simple statement of the rule itself.10
When the last clear chance doctrine was first recognized by the Florida
court it had already been "lost in the limbo of proximate cause."
7. Id. at 759. Subsequently, in pointing out the lower court's error in the instruction,
Lord Penzance stated, "but he [the judge) failed to add that if they [the jury] thought the
engine driver might at this stage of the matter [after the plaintiff had created the encum-
brance on the tracks] by ordinary care have avoided all accident, any previous negligence
of the Plaintiffs would not preclude them from recovering." Id. at 760. Thus the House of
Lords established the element of time sequence in order not to completely obviate the
doctrine of contributory negligence.
8. In The Vera Cruz (No. 1), 9 P.D. 88 (1884) the learned judge, referring to Lord
Penzance's comments in the Radley case, stated, "I think this passage ...went beyond
what the House of Lords intended. A decision to that effect would have put an end to the
doctrine of contributory negligence altogether." Id. at 93.
9. "[The doctrine of last clear chance] is generally stated to be law in the United
States; but a very brief examination of the cases will show that Davies v. Mann, although
cited without criticism by our courts, is generally cited as an authority for the proposition
that if the plaintiff is guilty of any negligence contributing directly, or as a proximate cause,
to the injury complained of, he cannot recover. The further question, whether the defendant
could by the use of due care avoid the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence, is ignored;
and Davies v. Mann is explained as a case where the plaintiff was allowed to recover
because his negligence was not contributory. . . .From American text-writers, on the other
hand, the case . . . has met with great disapproval. It has been attacked upon various
grounds, but principally as being a nullification of the whole doctrine of contributory
negligence." Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 H~av. L. REV.
263, "266 (1890). For subsequent early appraisals of the doctrine see generally: Shelton,
Last Clear Chance, 10 VA. L. REo. 301 (1904); Curry, The Last Clear Chance, 16 VA. L.
REo. 161 (1910); Smith, The "Last Clear Chance" Doctrine, 82 CENT. L.J. 425 (1916).
10. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. Rav. 3, 23 (1927).
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II. FLORIDA ACCEPTS THE DOCTRINE
Just as one cannot study "last clear chance" without first going to
Davies, one cannot approach Florida's concept of the doctrine without
first taking into account Merchant Transp. Co. v. Daniel."
Plaintiff brought this action against Merchants' Transportation
Company for her husband's wrongful death, which resulted from being
struck by the defendant's truck. The decedent was working on a bridge,
in clear view of oncoming traffic. Two workmen attempted to warn the
driver, who was rounding a curve, of the decedent's position, but he
was traveling at such an excessive speed that he could not stop in time
to avoid the impact. The trial court instructed the jury on the theory
of last clear chance as follows:
In this case, if you should find from the evidence that
the deceased, Emmet Daniel, was careless and negligent in
exposing himself to danger, but that after the said Daniel had
so exposed himself to danger the driver of defendant's auto-
mobile could have avoided the injury by using ordinary care in
keeping his automobile under proper control . . . and by
keeping a proper lookout ahead and that said driver failed to
use such ordinary care and that his failure in this respect
was the direct cause of the injury, then you should find for
the plaintiff.' 2
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant company
appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's
decision. Chief Justice Davis, speaking for the majority, 3 made the
following comment:
The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent,
is considered solely responsible for it. Such is a simple state-
ment of the doctrine of "the last clear chance." The last clear
chance doctrine is not an exception to the general doctrine of
contributory negligence. It does not permit one to recover in
spite of his contributory negligence, but merely operates to
relieve the negligence of a plaintiff . . . which would other-
wise be regarded as contributory, from its character as such.
This result it accomplishes by characterizing the negligence of
11. 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933) (subsequently cited as authority in almost every
decision involving the last clear chance doctrine in Florida).
12. Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401, 403 (1933). The
negligence of the defendant was that he was traveling at a speed which prohibited his
being able to take advantage of the warning. Further comments on the application of the
doctrine where one did not go prepared for an emergency situation are made in conjunc-
tion with Edwards v. Donaldson, 103 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958), at note 31 infra.
13 There were two separate concurring opinions, agreeing with the trial court's
judgment but disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of the last clear chance
doctrine.
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the defendant, if it intervenes between the negligence of
plaintiff . . . and the accident, as the sole proximate cause of
the injury, and the plaintiff's antecedent negligence merely as
a condition or remote cause ... thus ... it cannot be regarded
as contributory, since it is well established that negligence, in
order to be contributory, must be one of the proximate causes. 14
The above quoted language, 5 couched in terms of proximate cause,
reflected the majority position on the doctrine throughout the United
States."
In reviewing the facts, as Justice Ellis in his concurring special
opinion pointed out,'7 it is difficult to see why the instruction was needed
on the trial level. There appears to be no evidence as to the decedent's
negligence, and since negligence on the part of both parties is implicit
in the last clear chance doctrine," this was not a proper case to apply
the doctrine.' 9 The majority assumed negligence on the part of the
decedent and thereby established the doctrine. The subsequent growth,
modification, and entrenchment of the doctrine, can be seen by examining
common fact patterns wherein the doctrine is applied or denied.
14. Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401, 403 (1933).
15. These particular comments were too restrictive with respect to the doctrine's
intended purpose. Such language only serves to confuse and complicate the doctrine's applica-
bility. In his final remarks on the doctrine, the Chief Justice stated: "Neither is the doctrine
of last clear chance applicable where the negligence of either party is concurrent. Last clear
chance implies thought, appreciation, mental direction, and the lapse of sufficient time to
effectually act upon the impulse to save another from injury, or proof of circumstances
which will put the one charged to implied notice of the situation." 109 Fla. at 504, 149
So. at 404. For further comment on this passage see Annot., 92 A.L.R. at 64 (1934).
16. Annot., 92 A.R. 103 n.57 (1934).
17. Justice Ellis' opinion, 109 Fla. at 512, 149 So. at 406, is in essence a dissent to
the majority's interpretation of the last clear chance doctrine. His opinion, supported by
a substantial amount of foreign citations, evinced some depth in his research and approached
more nearly the original doctrine established in Davies v. Mann, note 1 supra. It is inter-
esting to note that in Florida's second last clear chance case, Lindsey v. Thomas, 128 Fla.
293, 174 So. 418 (1937), Justice Ellis again concurred for the same reasons as in the
Merchants' case, and yet one year later, he wrote a majority opinion, therein adopting the
Merchants' theory. Miami Beach Ry. Co. v. Dohme, 131 Fla. 171, 179 So. 166 (1938).
18. Lindsey v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 293, 174 So. 418 (1937); Lee County Oil Co., Inc. v.
Marshall, 98 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1957).
19. In the case of Wawner v. Sellic Stone Studio, 74 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954), the
supreme court was again faced with a similar fact pattern as that presented in the
Merchants' case. In this case plaintiff was in the street conducting an engineering survey
for the city. Defendant's truck driver saw the plaintiff but failed to turn, stop or sound a
warning. The truck struck the plaintiff while going thirty miles per hour. The trial court
instructed on contributory negligence, but refused to instruct on last clear chance. The
supreme court reversed on the ground that an instruction on last clear chance should have
been given. It is difficult to envisio i justification for the contributory negligence instruction
on the facts presented. Again this appears to be a case wherein negligence on the part of
plaintiff is doubtful and therfore the facts. possibly do not present a last clear chance
situation.
1963]
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A. Pedestrian Crossing Cases
In the case of Lindsay v. Thomas,20 the defendant's automobile was
being driven by her sixteen-year-old daughter in an Orlando residential
section. The plaintiff and his wife, in attempting to cross the street,
were struck by the defendant's vehicle, resulting in serious injury to
the plaintiff and the death of his wife. The speed of the automobile was
moderate and apparently the injured couple had thought they could
complete the crossing before the car could reach the intersection.
The court said that the doctrine is applicable when the defendant,
by the exercise of due care, should know of the plaintiff's situation, and
should realize the peril involved therein. In addition, the defendant
must have reason to believe that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore
will not extricate himself from the danger.2 '
The effect of Lindsay is lasting. This is clearly pointed out in
Springer v. Morris,22 where, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff,
who had been struck by an auto while attempting to cross a street at
night, the Florida Supreme Court held that the charge of last clear
chance was proper if the defendant could have discovered and appreci-
ated the plaintiff's peril. 28
But this is not to say that the last clear chance doctrine is available
to all negligent pedestrians. Underlying the cases in which the doctrine
is applied is the fact that the plaintiff could not extricate himself from
his self-imposed peril. While there are several cases denying the appli-
cation of the doctrine, there are only a few factual situations presented
by these decisions.
Plaintiff, an air cadet, dressed in a dark blue uniform, was walking
on an asphalt street (there was an available sidewalk several feet off
the road) at about midnight. The defendant was traveling the speed
limit but was unable to see the plaintiff until he was within ten feet of
him, at which time he could not avoid the impact.24 In that case there
was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, but only on
the part of the plaintiff and therefore, the doctrine did not apply. That
20. 128 Fla. 293, 174 So. 418 (1937).
21. The court footnoted this discussion to RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 479, 480 (1934),
and then commented that "the 'last clear chance' rule is founded upon the actual or implied
knowledge of the defendant in cases where he attempts to set up alleged negligent conduct
of plaintiff as a bar to the cause of action under a plea of contributory negligence."
Lindsay v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 293, 298, 174 So. 418, 420 (1937).
22. 74 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
23. Ibid. See also Williams v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 270, 9 So.2d 369 (1942); Hodell v.
Snyder, 122 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960) wherein failure to instruct on the doctrine was
held reversible error when the driver saw the pedestrian crossing the street about sixty-five
feet ahead and made no effort to avoid the collision.
24. Falnes v. Kaplan, 101 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1958).
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case, and those noted in the margin,25 are readily justifiable in their
refusal to apply the doctrine.
But there is another group of cases, not so clear in their reasoning,
which deny application of the doctrine on the basis of "concurrent neg-
ligence."2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized this
bar to the use of the doctrine as part of Florida law in Humphries v.
Boersma.27 The plaintiff was crossing a street at some distance from the
intersection. The impact occurred in the early evening. Both parties
claimed to be looking, but neither saw the other. The court held that
the plaintiff must show that he was free of "concurring negligence," or
in other words, that the plaintiff prove that his negligence did not con-
tinue until the time of impact.2 8 In a more recent case, where the plaintiff
was struck while walking on a highway in the early morning, the Fifth
Circuit reiterated its Humphries9 position.
An interesting set of facts in this area appears in Edwards v.
Donaldson."0 In that case the plaintiff was walking on a dimly lit road
at night and wearing dark clothing. There were no sidewalks and the
evidence was in conflict as to how far in the road he was walking.
There was also evidence that he had been drinking. The defendant was
driving a truck at approximately forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-
mile-per-hour speed zone. He saw the plaintiff about fifty feet away,
applied the brakes, skidded, and struck the plaintiff. The trial judge's
refusal of the plaintiff's instruction on the last clear chance doctrine was
affirmed since that instruction did not include a direction for the jury
to consider the plaintiff's negligence and determine at what point it
ceased.3'
25. Schoen v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1943) (where the
emergency is so sudden that there is no time to avert the accident, the doctrine is not
applicable); Douglas v. Hackney, 133 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1961) (the trial court did not err
by denying an instruction on the last clear chance doctrine where the defendant could not
have seen the plaintiff's peril) ; Turner v. Seegar, 151 Fla. 643, 10 So.2d 320 (1942) ; Green
v. Loudermilk, 146 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (the plaintiff created a situation where
the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care could not avoid the accident); Gordon v.
Cozart, 110 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
26. This concept originated in Florida in the Merchants' case from a portion quoted
in note 15 supra.
27. 190 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1951).
28. Ibid. It is submitted that what the court really meant in the Merchants' case was
that the doctrine requires that the defendant have time to appreciate the plaintiff's peril.
29. Cavitt v. Ferris, 269 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1959). The language of the Federal court
in this case and Humphries v. Boersma, note 28 supra, is clearly a misapprehension of the
doctrine. The plaintiff's contributory negligence must be shown by the defendant, for it is
an affirmative defense. The plaintiff need only show that the defendant could have dis-
covered him and his peril in time to prevent injury.
The decisions in both these cases may be correct inasmuch as the plaintiff was not
inextricably in peril; the impropriety is in the rationale adopted.
30. 103 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
31. Ibid. The question here was not one of when the plaintiff's negligence ceased, but
rather one of preparedness. That is--was the defendant in a position after discovery to do
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While the idea of concurrent negligence is not difficult to perceive
in light of the language in Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel,2 the fact
patterns wherein the concept is applied are often confusing. One of two
things may be said: either that there are several cases where the doctrine
should not have been applied due to contributory negligence, or there
are -several cases where the court erroneously prohibited the application
of last clear chance on the premise of concurrent negligence. The
confusion is really acute in those cases where this concept is applied
but the facts show no negligence on the part of the defendant. In those
cases the court rested a just decision on tenuous ground. 4 The impli-
cation would seem to be that if counsel for the defendant can charac-
terize the plaintiff's negligence as "concurrent" he will avoid the hard-
ship of the last clear chance doctrine.
But if confusion exists, it should be short-lived. The recent Florida
Supreme Court decision of James v. Keene 5 has taken a position in the
Florida courts equal to that of the Merchants' case. What the Merchants'
case did in establishing the doctrine, the James case appears to be doing
in finalizing the doctrine's form.
The facts in James are similar to those wherein concurrent neg-
ligence had been a bar. 6 The accident occurred on a clear evening with
good visibility when the plaintiff had almost completed crossing the
street. Each party had been negligent in not seeing the other prior to
anything about the situation? There are numerous decisions in foreign jurisdictions which,
as between the vehicle and the pedestrian, require the vehicle be under such control that
the operator could take advantage of the opportunity. E.g., Jenkins v. Southern Ry. Co., 196
N.C. 466, 146 S.E. 83 (1929) (negligence for the railroad to operate its train in such a
manner so that it could not be stopped before striking the deceased, where the company
had notice that the tracks at that point were in constant public use) ; Thompson v. Salt Lake
Rapid-Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92 (1898) (the placing of a trolley with defective
brakes upon the public street was negligence) ; Dent v. Bellows Falls & S.R. St. Ry. Co., 95
Vt. 523, 116 Atl. 83 (1922) (when a railroad knows that its bridge is used by pedestrians,
the duty rests upon it to keep a lookout for them, and to operate its cars with commensurate
care) ; Allen v. Schultz, 107 Wash. 393, 181 Pac. 916 (1919) (one who operates an auto-
mobile must take notice that he may be called upon to make emergency stops, and it is
negligence for him not to keep the brakes in such condition that such stops are possible).
See also Becker v. Blum, 142 Fla. 60, 194 So. 275 (1940), wherein the court speaks of con-
current negligence and yet the facts more readily lend themselves to that group of cases
set out in note 25 supra. As to the need for an explicit instruction see Radtke v. Loud, 98
So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
32. 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
33. A comparison of the pedestrian crossing cases will display cases with substantially
the same facts but opposite results, based on the court's determination of concurrent negli-
gence. E.g., Humphries v. Boersma, 190 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1951) ; James v. Keene, 133 So.2d
297 (Fla. 1961). Further, in some of the cases involving concurrent negligence, the courts
should have considered whether the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, could have
avoided the accident. E.g., Yousko v. Vogt, 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953) ; Williams v. Sauls, 151
Fla. 270, 9 So.2d 369 (1942) ; Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471, 1 So.2d 475 (1941).
34. E.g., Turner v. Seegar, 151 Fla. 643, 10 So.2d 320 (1942); Becker v. Blum, 142
Fla. 60, 194 So. 275 (1940).
35. 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961).
36. Humphries v. Boersma, 190 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1951).
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the impact. The Florida Supreme Court held that an instruction on the
doctrine of last clear chance should have been given since the defendant,
in the exercise of reasonable care, could have seen the plaintiff and
realized that she was either unaware of her perilous position, or unable
to do anything about it. Further, the jury might have found that the
defendant could have avoided the accident. 7
The court quoted from Parker v. Perfection Co-op. Dairies,8 wherein
it was held that the doctrine is applicable when the evidence shows:
(1) That the injured party has already come into a posi-
tion of peril; (2) that the injuring party then or thereafter
becomes, or in the exercise of ordinary prudence ought to have
become, aware not only of that fact, but also that the party
in peril either reasonably cannot escape from it, or apparently
will not avail himself of opportunities open to him for doing so;
(3) that the injuring party subsequently has the opportunity
by the exercise of reasonable care to save the other from harm;
and (4) that he fails to exercise such care.39
In conclusion the court, in James, pointed out that where the plaintiff
is not inextricably in peril and it is not apparent that he will fail to
extricate himself, the last clear chance doctrine does not apply."
The force and effect of the James case already can be seen in the
lower courts,41 and apparently will lend stability to this area of Florida
law.
B. Vehicular Collision Cases
The following cases can be separated from the above only by
factual distinction. An overview of these vehicle collision cases, coupled
with the pedestrian cases, provides a picture of the current doctrine in
Florida.
Panama City Transit Co. v. Du Vernoy 42 presents an excellent fact
pattern for the application of the doctrine. In that case the defendant's
bus was headed west and the plaintiff's motorcycle east; plaintiff was
speeding; the bus entered the intersection and came to a stop; it
then turned left into the path of the plaintiff and the vehicles collided."
37. James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961).
38. 102 So.2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
39. Id. at 647; James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1961). Compare with the
original doctrine set forth in Davies v. Mann, note 3 supra.
40. James v. Keene, note 37 supra.
41. Naber v. Scott, 149 So.2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) (pedestrian crossing); Gilman
v. Rupert, 145 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (pedestrian struck while standing in a parking
lot); Wasserman v. Miller, 143 So.2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (struck by the bed of a
passing truck while fishing from a bridge). All these cases applied the doctrine on the basis
of what the supreme court set forth in James v. Keene, note 37 supra.
42. 159 Fla. 890, 33 So.2d 48 (1947).
43. Ibid.
1963]
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The court stated that "the evidence gives rise to the application of the
doctrine of 'last clear chance,' which is a phase of the law of proximate
cause.) 44
Why the court should have introduced "the law of proximate cause"
is somewhat puzzling. If the defendant had the last opportunity to
avoid the collision, and failed to do so, that of itself imposes liability.
There is no issue of cause.
An earlier case, with substantially the same facts, held that where
the last clear chance was not raised in the pleadings it was not, error
for the court to give an instruction on the doctrine. 5
A child upon a bicycle near the edge of a road-way, a driver who
testified that he did not see the child, and sufficient evidence that the
driver could have seen him, was the framework of a more recent case,
which emphasized that the doctrine was applicable if the defendant in
the exercise of reasonable care could have seen the plaintiff's perilous
position.48
Holdsworth v. Crews47 presented an interesting and dramatic factual
pattern. The plaintiff was speeding down a state road toward the de-
fendant. The defendant hesitated, realizing he could not make his
turn in front of the oncoming car, but suddenly decided to attempt the
turn. The plaintiff swerved to miss the defendant and ran head on
into a tree, causing considerable damage. The appellate court affirmed
the granting of a new trial on the ground that the trial court had
denied the plaintiff's instruction on the last clear chance doctrine.48 This
case, the court said, was an example of the defendant's intervening negli-
gence, making the plaintiff's negligence remote. Again, it is submitted that
the introduction of the causation concept is uncalled for. It would be
enough if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the plaintiff's
injury.
In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant, the court in Ward
v. City Fuel Oil Co., Inc.,49 pointed out the necessity for appreciation
of the plaintiff's perilous predicament before the doctrine can come into
play. The facts showed that there was nothing in the situation to put
the defendant on notice that the plaintiff would collide with him. 0 This
44. Id. at 892, 33 So.2d at 50.
45. Dunn Bus Serv., Inc. v. McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937). The language
in this case was similar to that in Panama City Transit Co. v. Du Vernoy, 159 Fla. 890,
33 So.2d 48 (1947).
46. Royal Kitchen Cabinet Corp. v. Palcic, 111 So.2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
47. 129 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
48. Ibid.
49. 147 Fla. 320, 2 So.2d 586 (1941).
50. The facts were: plaintiff was on a horse attempting to cross the highway upon
which defendant's truck was proceeding. In an effort to avoid the truck, plaintiff's horse
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case, and Lee County Oil Co. v. Marshall,51 emphasize that the plaintiff
must be guilty of negligence in order to call for the application of the
doctrine. In the Lee case the plaintiff was a fireman who had been
struck by the defendant's truck while riding on the tail gate of the
fire engine. Nothing in the case indicated negligence on the part of
the plaintiff or his co-workers operating the fire engine. 2
There is another group of cases in this area where the last clear
chance doctrine was denied on the basis of concurrent negligence.58
The most important of these was Yousko v. Vogt. 4 In that case the
plaintiff was operating a motor scooter and the defendant a car; each
party had a clear, unobstructed view, but neither saw the other until the
instant before the appulse. While the court's comments on concurrent
negligence were not unique or stirring, the court did state that "such
a charge [last clear chance] should never be given unless the evidence
clearly demonstrates its applicability."" This cautionary note has been
seriously heeded by the courts in this last decade and is frequently
referred to.56
A most unusual approach to the application of the doctrine appears
in Miami Beach Ry. Co. v. Dohme.5 7 In that 1938 case the plaintiff,
in order to avoid striking an automobile pulling out of a parking place,
swerved into some trolley tracks and thereafter, was struck and injured
by the defendant's trolley. The Court, after discussing the doctrine of
last clear chance, held that the trial court should have given instructions
to the effect that last clear chance may be applicable against the plaintiff.
Fortunately this anomalous interpretation has never again reared its
head in a Florida opinion.5
C. Railroad Cases
It is to be noted that the doctrine of last clear chance played no
great part in Florida's railroad cases. Perhaps this unusual circumstance
was the result of Florida's well established comparative negligence
statute for railroad cases.5 9 In any event the last clear chance doctrine
veered into and collided with it, resulting in injury to plaintiff. Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co.,
Inc., note 49 supra.
51. 98 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1957).
52. Ibid.
53. Miami Transit Co. v. Goff, 66 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1953); Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471,
1 So.2d 475 (1941); Parker v. Perfection Co-op. Dairies, 102 So.2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
54. 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953).
55. Id. at 194 (Fla. 1953).
56. E.g., James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961); Gilman v. Rupert, 145 So.2d 746
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) ; Gordon v. Cozart, 110 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
57. 131 Fla. 171, 179 So. 166 (1938).
58. Compare Rollman v. Morgan, 73 Ariz. 305, 240 P.2d 1196 (1952), and City of
Pueblo v. Ratliff, 131 Colo. 377, 281 P.2d 1021 (1955), with Miami Beach Ry. Co. v.
Dohme, note 57 supra, for foreign decisions pointing out the absurdity of the Florida
decision.
59. Laws of Florida 1887, ch. 3744, § 1 at 117: "That no person shall recover
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was not raised and applied to a railroad case until six years after the
decision in Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel. Ia This first railroad case
was Kenan v. Withers,"° wherein the plaintiff, after entering upon a
railroad crossing, was blocked and enclosed thereon by the gates. There
was evidence to the effect that had the gate not blocked the plaintiff or
had the train been going at the proper speed, she would have escaped
injury. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's application
of the last clear chance doctrine in conjunction with Florida's compara-
tive negligence statute.61
Thereafter three cases applied the doctrine in a manner similar to
Kenan.6 2 But in Loftin v. Nolin,8 the Supreme Court of Florida brought
the application of the doctrine in railroad cases to an end. This was a
widow's action against a railroad company, arising out of a truck-train
collision at a crossing. The train was traveling at approximately ten
miles per hour. The decedent's truck was going about fifty miles per
hour. When the engineer first saw the decedent, he anticipated the truck
would "beat" the train; thereafter the engineer realized the truck would
not make it and attempted to halt the train. A collision ensued. In
reversing the trial court for giving an instruction on last clear chance,
the court said:
In addition to a review of the cases from this court with
reference to the last clear chance doctrine in comparative neg-
ligence cases, we have also reviewed articles by eminent text
writers on the subject [citing to various law review articles].
The consensus of these eminent writers is that justification for
the doctrine of last clear chance passes with the adoption of a
comparative negligence statute. 4
damages from a railroad company for injury to himself or to his property when the same
is done by his consent or is caused by his own negligence. If the complainant and the
agents of the company are both at fault the former may recover, but the damages shall
be diminished by the jury trying the case in proportion to the amount of default attribut-
able to him." Compare with FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1961), Florida's present comparative
negligence statute, which is substantially unchanged.
It has been suggested that comparative negligence rules could replace the need for
both the last clear chance and contributory negligence doctrines. But there are many
problems with this concept, especially in multiple party actions.
For a comprehensive article in favor of the use of the comparative negligence doctrine
see Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11
U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958). It is submitted that Professor Maloney's opinion of Florida's
last clear chance doctrine may now be more positive in the face of James v. Keene, 133
So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961).
59a. 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
60. 137 Fla. 561, 188 So. 95 (1939).
61. Ibid.
62. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 190 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1951); Consumers
Lumber & Veneer Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 117 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1941); Sea-
board Air Line Ry. Co. v. Martin, 56 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952), wherein the court held that the
doctrine of last clear chance could be applied in lieu of the comparative negligence statute.
63. 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958); 10 M IAMI
L. REv. 594 (1956).
64. Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1956).
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Interestingly enough, Georgia, having a similar statute, 5 held that the
doctrine of last clear chance was not incompatible with the statute
adopting the principle of comparative negligence."
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Loftin seems inconsistent
with its explanation of the doctrine. If the doctrine of last clear chance
is but a special instance of the general doctrine of proximate cause,67
there appears no logical reason why its application should be affected by
the comparative negligence statute, which was enacted primarily to
obviate the harsh effects of the common law rule of contributory negli-
gence." But if the doctrine is only a question of time sequence, then
clearly it should be swallowed by the adoption of a comparative negli-
gence statute.6 9
D. Aircraft Collision Cases
Florida has only one aircraft case wherein the doctrine was in-
volved-the case of Shattuck v. Mullen.7' The plaintiff was landing
while the defendant had "touched down" and was taking off again.
When the defendant saw the plaintiff, she made an effort to avoid him,
but it was too late. The planes collided fifty feet from the ground and as
a result the plaintiff "nosed" in and was severely injured. Each party
alleged that the other should have seen the oncoming plane in time to
avoid the collision. The trial judge gave an instruction on last clear
chance over the defendant's objection. The appellate court stated:
This court ... will discuss the applicability of the last clear
chance doctrine to the instant case involving an aircraft collision
in the same manner as this doctrine has traditionally been
applied to automobile cases in Florida. 7 1
The court then held that this was a case of concurrent negligence and
65. GA. CODE ANN., § 94-703 (1937):
No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to him-
self or his property, where the same is done by his consent or is caused by his own
negligence. If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault,
the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in pro-
portion to the amount of fault attributable to him.
Compare with the Florida statute, note 59 supra.
66. Lovett v. Sandersville, 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E.2d 664 (1945).
67. Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
68. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958). "There is little decisional authority in the United
States for the proposition that under comparative negligence statutes or rules, the doctrine
of last clear chance is no longer necessary or applicable." Id. at 1267.
69. Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956), works as a complete prohibition to the
application of the last clear chance doctrine in Florida railroad cases. That this is a sound
view see Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform,
11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958).
70. 115 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
71. Shattuck v. Mullen, 115 So.2d 597, 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959). From the facts of
this case it is difficult to perceive negligence on the part of the defendant. Therefore the
court's discussion of concurrent negligence may be open to criticism.
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that therefore the giving of an instruction on the doctrine was reversible
error.
While the Shattuck case was not appealed to the Florida Supreme
Court, that court probably would have accepted the district court's ap-
proach to the doctrine in aircraft collision cases in light of the supreme
court decisions in the automobile collision cases.
III. SUMM ARY
The doctrine of last clear chance originated in England to counter
the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence.72 At its inception the
doctrine had four elements: (1) the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence; (2) this negligence had placed the plaintiff in an inextricably
perilous position; (3) the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care
either did or should have seen and appreciated the plaintiff's peril;
and (4) at such time the defendant by the exercise of reasonable care
could have avoided the accident.78 This concept was accepted in Florida
as a method of determining which party, if any, was the "sole proximate
cause" of the injury being sued upon.74
The doctrine of last clear chance has been developing in Florida for
the past thirty years. Several concluding comments can be made in
reference to that development. It has been established that the doctrine
need not be raised in the pleadings in order for an instruction to be
given.75 It is essential that the evidence demonstrate the doctrine's
applicability before an instruction may be given. 76 If the court does
charge the jury on the doctrine, the charge should explain the doctrine of
last clear chance and how the jury is to apply it to their findings.77
Finally, James v. Keene71 has crystallized the doctrine in Florida
into the following elements: (1) the plaintiff, through his own negligence,
comes into a position of peril; (2) the defendant becomes, or in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care should become, aware of the plaintiff's position;
(3) the plaiptiff either cannot or will not extricate himself; (4) the
defendant has time to appreciate the peril and an opportunity to save the
plaintiff from harm by the exercise of reasonable care; and (5) the
defendant fails to exercise such care. 79
A comparison of this Florida formula with the original displays a
72. Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HAav. L. REV.
263 (1890).
73. Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
74. Merchants' Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933). It should be
noted that this approach of the court was an unnecessary complication of the doctrine.
75. Dunn Bus Serv., Inc. v. McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
76. Yousko v. Vogt, 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953).
77. Radtke v. Loud, 98 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
78. James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961).
79. Ibid.
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favorable resemblance, the Florida doctrine being of greater depth. Many
states apply the doctrine only if the defendant actually discovers the
victim's peril.80 Florida has never limited itself in this fashion. Therefore,
Florida has an effective and comprehensive last clear chance doctrine.
80. 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958); Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence:
A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 135 (1958).
